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Abstract 
While the business press suggests that “winning the talent war,” the attraction and 
retention of key talent, is increasingly pivotal to organization success, executives often report 
that their organizations do not fare well on this dimension.  We demonstrate how, through 
integrating turnover and compensation research, the Boudreau and Berger (1985) staffing utility 
framework can be used by industrial/organizational (I/O) psychologists and other human 
resource (HR) professionals to address this issue.  Employing a step-by-step process that 
combines organization-specific information about pay and performance with research on the 
pay-turnover linkage, we estimate the effects of incentive pay on employee separation patterns 
at various performance levels.  We then use the utility framework to evaluate the financial 
consequences of incentive pay as an employee retention vehicle.  The demonstration illustrates 
the limitations of standard accounting and behavioral cost-based approaches and the 
importance of considering both the costs and benefits associated with pay-for-performance 
plans.  Our results suggest that traditional accounting or behavioral cost-based approaches, 
used alone, would have supported rejecting a potentially lucrative pay-for-performance 
investment.  Additionally, our approach should enable HR professionals to use research 
findings and their own data to estimate the retention patterns and subsequent financial 
consequences of their existing, and potential, company-specific performance-based pay 
policies. 
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Is it Worth it to Win the Talent War? 
Evaluating the Utility of Performance-Based Pay 
 
The ability to achieve competitive advantage through people depends in large part on 
the composition of the work force.  This, in turn, is a function of who is hired, how they are 
developed, and who is retained—the latter of which is the focus of this study.  Voluntary 
employee turnover can be either dysfunctional or functional for the organization, depending on 
who leaves (Boudreau, 1991; Boudreau & Berger, 1985; Hollenbeck & Williams, 1986; Trevor, 
2001).  Both low and high performers are generally more likely to leave an organization than are 
average performers (Jackofsky, 1984; Trevor, Gerhart, & Boudreau, 1997; Williams & 
Livingstone, 1994).  Thus, organizations often will shed poor employees (functional turnover), 
but will also fail to retain star employees (dysfunctional turnover).  It appears, however, that 
organizational practices can influence the performance distribution of leavers.  Specifically, 
though high performers typically may leave the organization more often than do average 
performers, they do not necessarily do so.  While research consistently reports that an 
organization’s pay system affects the probability of voluntary turnover (Dreher, 1982; Gerhart & 
Milkovich, 1992; Griffeth, Hom, & Gaertner, 2000; Harrison, Virick, & William, 1996; Porter & 
Lawler, 1968; Schwab, 1991; Steers & Mowday, 1981; Trevor et al., 1997), the probability of 
high-performer turnover is particularly sensitive to the strength of the pay-for-performance link 
(Trevor et al., 1997).  Consequently, organizations may be able to design compensation 
systems to enhance organizational value by targeting retention efforts at the dysfunctional high 
performer turnover. 
This may in fact be increasingly happening as organizations in the United States and 
abroad are progressing toward linking pay more strongly to performance (Milkovich & Newman, 
2002).  Although many organizations have expanded their use of plans that reward team, 
business unit, and corporate performance (Milkovich & Newman, 2002), the predominant basis 
for pay-for-performance continues to be individual performance (IOMA, 2002; Hewitt 
Associates, 2002), and survey data indicate that companies believe individual pay-for-
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performance programs are effective (IOMA, 2002).  While there are concerns about the wisdom 
of pay-for-performance (e.g., Kohn, 1993; Pfeffer, 1998), particularly for individual performance, 
research reviews find ample evidence that pay-for-performance is associated with higher 
performance at both the individual (Jenkins, Mitra, Gupta, & Shaw, 1998) and organizational 
levels of analysis (Gerhart, 2000). Such research, however, has not explicitly examined the 
mechanisms through which pay-for-performance plans affect individual behaviors to influence 
the organizational bottom line. One such mechanism involves pay-for-performance’s effects on 
performance-specific turnover, and the associated costs and benefits that contribute to 
organizational financial performance. 
The professional HR literature suggests that influencing the retention of high performers 
in particular is a crucial matter.  Many articles cite the increasing difficulty in obtaining and 
keeping top talent (e.g., Bartlett & Ghoshal, 2002; Branch, 1998; Chambers, 1998; Rich, 1999).  
A report based on interviews of over 5,000 executives and managers (McKinsey & Company, 
1998), for example, found that 65% of executives believed that they had insufficient talent in the 
ranks of their top 300 leaders and only 10% strongly believed that their companies retained 
most of their high performers.  Even with the recent economic slowdown, organizations face 
increased pressures to attract and retain top talent in their most pivotal talent areas.  The 
Bureau of Labor Statistics projects that, by 2010, the labor supply will grow by 17 million 
(Fullerton & Toosi, 2001) while labor demand will increase by 22.2 million (Berman, 2001), 
indicating that labor shortages will play increasing roles in the future.  Moreover, even if a 
company is reducing employee headcount, voluntary attrition is often the first and most 
attractive option (Sherwyn & Sturman, 2002).  Each of these circumstances highlights the 
potential benefits of managerial investments that particularly facilitate top-performer retention. 
Few would debate the merits of a performance-based pay practice that, all else equal, 
resulted in greater retention of high performers.  Unfortunately, all else is far from equal when 
changing an organization’s pay systems.  Because such changes will affect total labor costs, 
individual employee pay levels, and subsequent employee behaviors, the critical question 
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becomes one of whether the benefits of such a practice outweigh the costs.  We propose that 
while the potential retention benefits of incentive pay have been recognized, they have yet to be 
quantified in dollar terms.  Moreover, researchers have failed to adequately address actual 
costs of performance-based bay.  Our goal here is to provide the first empirical cost-benefit 
assessment of the viability of performance-based pay.  Our approach should contribute to the 
pay-for-performance literature by specifying the circumstances that affect the success of pay-
for-performance plans. 
Our results should also contribute to practice, as the likelihood that HR professionals 
would apply the research findings to their own organizations should increase if these 
professionals are provided with a viable technique for doing so.  In this paper we demonstrate 
such a technique.  The employee movement utility model of Boudreau and Berger (1985) 
provides the means to evaluate the dollar value implications of various pay-for-performance 
strategies, which we illustrate with a step-by-step application to a published turnover and pay-
for-performance article.  In doing so, we (a) demonstrate how organizational representatives 
can use research findings, publicly available compensation and turnover data, or their own data 
to diagnose, inform, and evaluate their own company-specific incentive pay decisions; and (b), 
demonstrate that this technique will often provide different conclusions from typical decision 
models that use only traditional cost or accounting analysis. 
Utility Analysis Applied to Pay Decisions 
Utility analysis is a tool for cost-benefit analysis that helps quantify the impact of human 
resource interventions (Cascio, 2000).  While utility analysis has been applied to numerous 
human resource program areas, most applications have concentrated in the areas of employee 
selection and training (Boudreau & Ramstad, 2003b; 1999; Boudreau, 1991).  The Boudreau 
and Berger (1985) framework represents one of the few applications to employee retention.  
Klass and McClendon (1996) used that framework to examine the pay policy decision of 
whether to lead, lag or match the market. They gathered parameter information from published 
studies and simulated effects on employee separation and offer acceptance patterns. Results 
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for bank tellers suggested that a lag policy produced higher payoffs, although “leading the 
market” (paying higher than the average) did enhance retention and attraction of top 
candidates. The authors noted that these results did not necessarily suggest using a particular 
pay policy, and showed how simulated reductions in citizenship behavior due to low pay might 
change the results.  This was an important initial application of employee movement utility 
principles to decisions about pay. 
In this paper, we focus on a different type of pay decision – how to allocate pay 
increases across employees at different performance levels.  Trevor et al. (1997) found that pay 
policies providing greater pay growth for high performers (and less for low performers) 
substantially increased retention among high performers, encouraged separation among low 
performers, and thus increased the value of the work force.  This is an appealing prospect, but it 
is unclear whether the enhanced workforce value would offset the cost associated with such a 
reward system.  Such costs are quite apparent using traditional accounting or behavioral 
costing models, but such models have limited ability to reflect effects on workforce value; 
furthermore, little data exists on the actual implications of these limitations (Boudreau & 
Ramstad, 2003a; 2003b).  It is also unclear to what extent the enhanced workforce value would 
depend on such factors as the pay policy specifics, the retention pattern, and the variability in 
performance.  The Boudreau-Berger utility framework provides a method to address these 
questions. 
Using the Boudreau and Berger (1985) separation/acquisition utility model, our paper 
presents a model that captures the value associated with employee separations (turnover) and 
acquisitions (hires) over time.  The model estimates three components in each time period: (a) 
movement costs—the costs associated with employee separations and acquisitions; (b) service 
costs—the pay, benefits, and associated expenses required to support the work force; and (c) 
service value—the value of the goods and services produced by the work force.  The dollar-
valued implications of a given pay plan, and of the subsequent separation and acquisition 
patterns over time, are estimated by subtracting the movement costs and service costs from the 
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service value (i.e., subtracting the pay plan’s costs from its benefits).  Figure 1 shows the steps 
necessary to compute this estimate and the tables we employ here to illustrate these steps. 
 
 
Figure 1 
Flow Chart of Utility Analysis Procedure 
 
The Illustrative Case Study 
We illustrate our approach using a scenario in which a hypothetical company is 
considering implementing a pay-for-performance plan at the end of the year 2003.  We assume 
that the company does not currently relate pay to performance, so under the current strategy all 
employees would receive the same pay increases over time.  We compare the effects of this 
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strategy with those of two alternative strategies that place different emphases on pay-for-
performance.  We choose to evaluate the implications of the three possible approaches over a 
four-year period (2004 to 2007).  Thus, because pay-for-performance affects turnover differently 
at different levels of performance (Trevor et al., 1997), the 2007 workforce would reflect a 
different performance distribution under each of the three pay strategies.  By calculating the 
movement costs, service costs, and service values from 2004 to 2007, we can estimate the 
cumulative effects of the pay strategies over the four-year period.1 
We used a number of spreadsheets to make the necessary calculations, with each 
spreadsheet corresponding to a table in this paper.  The spreadsheets are available from the 
lead author upon request, although the descriptions we provide here should be sufficient for 
many readers to create their own.  We also make a number of assumptions to perform the 
necessary calculations.  These assumptions are all based on published research (e.g., Trevor 
et al., 1997) or publicly available data (e.g., BLS, 2002).  First, we draw directly from the Trevor 
et al. (1997) study to estimate (a) the relationship between pay growth, performance, and 
turnover that is captured in their survival analysis (see Appendix) and is used to calculate the 
turnover probabilities at each performance level under each pay strategy; (b) the baseline 
turnover probability necessary to compute those turnover probabilities that are specific to each 
performance level-pay strategy combination; and (c) the performance distribution at the 
beginning of our utility analysis timeframe.  
It should be noted that the Trevor et al. (1997) data are from all 5,143 exempt 
employees hired by a large petrochemical organization between 1983 and 1988.  Furthermore, 
Trevor et al. (1997) examined the effects of various strengths of pay-for-performance 
relationships based on archival data on individuals’ performance and pay levels; they did not 
specifically manipulate the pay-for-performance link as part of either an experimental or quasi-
experimental design.  Nonetheless, these data represent a wide variety of exempt jobs over 
several years, and the results provide valuable insight into the relationships between turnover, 
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pay, and performance.  Thus, the results of the Trevor et al. (1997) study are useful for our 
purpose of illustrating our technique.  
Second, we use published surveys (WorldatWork, 2002; BLS, 2002) to help generate 
realistic pay strategies, determine starting average pay levels, and estimate benefit costs.  
Finally, we employ the results of published research studies to help provide realistic estimates 
of the cost of turnover (e.g., Solomon, 1988; Johnson, 1995) and the value of different levels of 
employee performance (Becker and Huselid, 1992; Boudreau, 1991; Cascio, 2000; Schmidt and 
Hunter, 1983). We describe the rationale for our assumptions and suggest how professionals 
might apply each rationale or gather their own data to customize the application for their 
organizations.  Thus, our demonstration is intended (a) to provide information on the value of 
pay-for-performance plans and the extent that they should ultimately lead to improved 
organizational financial success; and (b) to enable others to use the method with their own 
company’s data, new research findings, and/or their own estimates to create company-specific 
evaluations to facilitate their own decision-making regarding the implementation of pay-for-
performance policies. 
 
Pay-For-Performance Plans and Performance-Specific Turnover  
Step 1:  Specify the Pay-for-Performance Options 
As is evident in Figure 1, the first major phase in estimating the costs and benefits of 
performance-based pay is to make explicit the relevant organizational characteristics and 
assumptions.  The initial step within this phase is to specify the pay policy scenarios to be 
considered.  The two key parameters needed are: (a) the current pay level in each performance 
category for the employees to be considered; and (b) the relationship between pay growth and 
performance levels (usually expressed in terms of the percentage increase awarded for each 
performance level).  For this second parameter, we constructed three hypothetical, but realistic, 
performance-based pay strategies.  Because we intend to provide a broad range of potential 
outcomes, within which most particular organizational results should fall, the strategies were 
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chosen to range from conservative to aggressive in terms of the pay-for-performance link.  In 
terms of performance categories, we adopted the nine performance-rating categories used by 
Trevor et al. (1997), which range from 1.0 (lowest performance) to 5.0 (highest performance) in 
0.5 increments, because this will facilitate using other aspects of the Trevor et al. situation as an 
illustration.  Trevor et al. (1997) created the nine categories by computing average performance 
over time from a rating system in which “The performance scale ranged from 1 = lowest to 5 = 
highest, with the five categories representing levels of consistency in meeting and exceeding 
the basic requirements of the job” (p. 49).  Professionals adopting our utility analysis framework 
should change the performance categories to reflect their own performance assessment 
approach.  
Table 1 
Pay Strategies and Estimated Four-Year Pay Levels for Each Strategy 
 
Performance 
Ratings: 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 
Pay Increase for Pay 
Strategy 1 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 
Pay Increase for Pay 
Strategy 2 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 
Pay Increase for Pay 
Strategy 3 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 
2003 Average Pay $47,983 $47,983 $47,983 $47,983 $47,983 $47,983 $47,983 $47,983 $47,983
Pay Strategy 1:  No pay/performance link 
2007 Average Pay $56,133 $56,133 $56,133 $56,133 $56,133 $56,133 $56,133 $56,133 $56,133
Pay Strategy 2:  Pay for performance e link for above average performer 
2007 Average Pay $56,133 $56,133 $56,133 $56,133 $56,133 $58,324 $60,577 $62,896 $65,280
Pay Strategy 3:  Pay for performance link for all performers 
2007 Average Pay $47,983 $49,931 $51,938 $54,005 $56,133 $58,324 $60,577 $62,896 $65,280
 
Note:  Data provided by the user are in bold. 
 
The details of our three illustrative pay-for-performance plans are shown in Table 1.  Pay 
strategy 1 gives all employees the same average pay increase, regardless of performance level.  
Data suggest that current pay increases average 4% (WorldatWork, 2002; BLS, 2002; Peck, 
2002), so we used this value for all performance categories in pay strategy 1.  Pay strategy 2 
creates a pay-performance link (i.e., larger pay increases as performance improves) for 
performers above the middle “3.0” rating, and average pay increases (i.e., 4%) to those rated 
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3.0 and below.  Pay strategy 3 maintains the positive reinforcement of pay strategy 2, and 
extends the pay-for-performance link to those below the middle rating (i.e., smaller pay 
increases as performance worsens).  Thus, pay strategy 1 provides no performance link, pay 
strategy 2 is more aggressive, and pay strategy 3 is the most aggressive.   
As noted above, in addition to the pay raise strategy, step one requires the setting of an 
initial pay level upon which the pay strategies will be applied.  Because our example involves 
evaluating the pay-for-performance strategies for white-collar employees, we used the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics (BLS, 2002) estimate of average 2001 white collar (non-sales) pay, adjusted 
for the average salary increases of exempt workers for 2002 and 2003 (WorldatWork, 2002).  
This ultimately yielded a pay level of $47,983 for the year 2003.2 For illustration, we simply 
assigned this same initial pay level to every performance category.  Then, applying the 
percentage increase associated with each pay strategy and extrapolating for four future years, 
we projected the resulting performance-specific pay levels for the year 2007, as reported in 
Table 1. 
In actual organizations, of course, the current pay levels would be available from 
company records.  The same forward-projection method can be used based on these initial 
values.  With observations of real data, it seems likely that initial pay levels will vary across 
performance categories, reflecting past pay policies, demographics, and performance 
distributions.  While quite easy to observe in practice, pay-performance distributions are likely 
quite variable, so no obvious method exists to simulate them for our example.  Our decision to 
begin with a uniform pay distribution across categories simplifies the presentation but does not 
otherwise reduce the generalizability of our approach.      
Step 2:  Determine Turnover Probabilities 
The second step in the making explicit of organizational characteristics and assumptions 
(i.e., the first major phase in Figure 1) is to estimate the probability of separation at each 
performance level for each pay strategy.  This step defines the key link between performance-
based pay and workforce composition. For practitioners, this may represent the most novel 
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element of the model, yet we believe it is quite feasible. We describe several methods for 
estimating these probabilities. 
Estimation using existing research literature 
Perhaps the most straightforward approach is to refer to existing empirical findings.  For 
our hypothetical example, we use the performance level/pay strategy specific separation results 
generated by Trevor et al. (1997).  Professionals employing utility analysis likely would prefer to 
access separation probabilities from a study of an employee population that resembled their 
own employees in terms of occupations, industry, and demographics.  To date, however, the 
Trevor et al. (1997) study is the only published work from which the performance level/pay 
strategy specific separation probabilities can be estimated.  While future research providing 
such information for different employee populations would be helpful, in their absence, the 
Trevor et al. (1997) results offer a useful starting point. 
Estimation using organizational data 
A second option for generating the performance level/pay strategy specific separation 
probabilities that are necessary for the cost-benefit analysis would be for professionals to 
estimate them using their own organization’s data. In most companies, separation rates are 
customarily calculated for entire job categories and are seldom broken down by performance 
levels.  Even when separation rates are reported by performance levels, they are rarely further 
broken down to reflect pay growth.  Yet, if yearly individual-level information on performance, 
pay level, and separation is available, it can rather easily be converted into the required 
separation probabilities estimates.  
First, professionals can compute each employee’s average pay growth and average 
employee performance over a specified time period (e.g., over the last three years).  These 
relatively continuous data can then be used to slot employees into performance level/pay 
strategy categories, such as Table 1’s 27 categories that were created from all combinations of 
three pay strategies and nine performance levels.  This approach would be repeated for all 
appropriate performance level and pay growth combinations, thus yielding counts of employees 
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that fit each category.  After compiling these counts, the second step would be simply to divide 
each category’s number of voluntary separations by the number of employees in that category.  
This would yield the estimates of the separation probabilities specific to each performance 
level/pay strategy combination that are necessary for conducting the cost-benefit analysis of 
performance-based pay. 
While relatively simple to describe, estimating category-specific separation probabilities 
from one’s own organization involves two potentially difficult hurdles.  First, to estimate the 
separation probabilities with any degree of reliability, there must be an adequate number of 
employees in the categories of interest. If the number of employees in a given category is low, 
then the resultant average rate of turnover may be strongly influenced by sampling error rather 
than reflecting an accurate estimate of that category’s true turnover likelihood (e.g., a category 
with one employee mandates an unrealistic separation probability estimate of either one or 
zero). Thus, the HR professional or I/O psychologist must be working with relatively few 
categories and/or with large employee populations.  A second serious problem with the 
approach described above is that it will produce separation probabilities that are likely to be 
confounded by other factors that are related to turnover, performance, and pay growth, such as 
pay level, age, gender, and tenure with the organization.  Hence, though computing 
performance level/pay strategy specific separation probabilities for one’s own organization is 
relatively simple, its value may be limited. 
Fortunately, two statistical methods are available for dealing with the confounding and 
employee-per-category problems.  While both of these methods require a statistical package 
and reasonable statistical sophistication, I/O psychologists may well have been exposed to one 
or both of the methods.  If not, their training still may well have provided them with a 
methodological foundation sufficient to allow them to learn the techniques, particularly with the 
advances in user-friendly statistical software.  Alternatively, HR professionals or I/O 
psychologists could simply hire a consultant to assist with the analyses.   
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Logistic regression and survival analysis can be used to estimate separation 
probabilities.  Both explicitly account for the potential confound described above by statistically 
controlling for the effects of these other variables.  The analyses yield partial coefficients that 
are net of the effects of the potentially confounding variables.  The partial coefficients are then 
used to compute separation probabilities needed to conduct the cost-benefit analysis.  Both 
methods also exploit the full range of the relatively continuous salary growth and performance 
data, rather than requiring pre-established categories that necessarily result in a loss of 
information.  Logistic regression estimates the probability of separation over a specified time 
period.  Survival analysis (Kalbfleisch & Prentice, 1980) computes the probability of survival 
(i.e., not separating) over a specified time span, and accounts for the length of time an 
individual stays before leaving the organization.  In other words, survival analysis specifically 
models how long an individual remains with an employer before leaving, whereas logistic 
regression models whether a person leaves or not.  While both methods are appropriate for 
estimating the separation probabilities specific to the performance level/pay strategy 
combinations of interest, each offers advantages under certain circumstances (for a complete 
discussion of this issue, see Morita, Lee, & Mowday, 1993). Our Appendix describes the use of 
survival analysis to calculate the required separation probabilities that are specific to each of our 
performance level/pay strategy combinations.        
Estimated separation probabilities for the example. 
For our example, we used the survival analysis results reported in Trevor et al. (1997), 
which estimated a survival model from data on a sample of exempt employees in one 
organization.  The analysis produced a mathematical function describing survival probabilities 
as a function of salary growth and performance, which we present in the Appendix.  Substituting 
a specific salary growth amount and performance level into the equation produces an estimated 
survival probability that is appropriate for that performance level and salary growth combination.  
Thus, we used the equation reported in Trevor et al.’s (1997) Table 4 (p. 54) to compute the 
separation probability (1.0 minus the survival probability), for each performance category under 
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each pay strategy, at the end of our example’s 4-year period.  The estimated separation 
probabilities are presented in the top part of Table 2. 
 
Table 2 
Turnover Probabilities, and Estimate Number of Retained and Replaced Employees 
Performance 
Ratings: 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 Total
Number of 
employees 60 97 1171 1090 1667 672 317 46 23 5143
Turnover Probabilities1 (Probability of leaving the organization by 2007) 
Pay Strategy 1 0.96 0.65 0.38 0.25 0.21 0.22 0.27 0.41 0.66  
Pay Strategy 2 0.96 0.65 0.38 0.25 0.21 0.14 0.11 0.11 0.14  
Pay Strategy 3 0.99 0.88 0.60 0.35 0.21 0.14 0.11 0.11 0.14  
Retained Employees (2007) 
Pay Strategy 1 2 34 726 818 1317 524 231 27 8 3687
Pay Strategy 2 2 34 726 818 1317 578 282 41 20 3818
Pay Strategy 3 1 12 468 709 1317 578 282 41 20 3428
Replaced Employees (2004 - 2007)2 
Pay Strategy 1 58 63 445 273 350 148 86 19 15 1457
Pay Strategy 2 58 63 445 273 350 94 35 5 3 1326
Pay Strategy 3 59 85 703 382 350 94 35 5 3 1716
 
Notes:  1.  These values were based on analyses from the Trevor et al. (1997) study.  Those 
performing their own analyses would need to complete the table with their own company-specific 
data, or use approximations from the Trevor et al. results.  See the Appendix for how we used the 
Trevor et al. results to obtain our values above. 
2.  Recall that we are evaluating the effects of the different pay policies going into effect at the end 
of 2004.  Thus, while our data are based on the state of the workforce at the end of 2003, we are 
evaluating the effects of the programs in 2004-2007. 
3.  Data provided by the user are in bold. 
 
We caution that our use of the Trevor et al. (1997) survival analysis provides reasonable 
separation probability estimates, rather than definitive ones.  It is certainly probable that other 
factors could also influence the probability of turnover.  For example, equity theory suggests that 
even when high performers receive the same pay increase (such as under Pay Strategy 2 and 
Pay Strategy 3), their turnover likelihoods may differ as a function of how referent others (e.g., 
low performers) are compensated.  Our approach does not take this into consideration.  Thus, 
the reader should keep in mind the imperfections associated with relying on any single study, 
model of turnover, or data set to estimate turnover probabilities. 
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Step 3:  Determine Performance Distribution and Number of Separations 
So far, we have established the pay increase that individuals in each performance level 
will receive under the different pay policies, and we have subsequently established the 
separation probabilities for each performance level/pay strategy category.  Next, we need to 
project the number of separations in each performance level/pay strategy category over time.  
We specified our initial hypothetical employee group (those at the end of year 2003) to mirror in 
size and performance distribution the 5,143 employees analyzed by Trevor et al. (1997), which 
is shown in Table 2 (in actual organizations, the initial number of employees in each 
performance category would be identified through a straightforward count).  We then multiplied 
the initial number of employees in each performance level/pay strategy category by the 
appropriate separation probability.  Table 2 presents the resultant category-specific numbers of 
employees that separated (and will need to be replaced) and employees retained.   
At this point, a traditional analysis of total separations would likely lead to a decision to 
adopt pay strategy 2, the moderately-aggressive policy through which performers above the 
midpoint receive higher pay increases.  As Table 2 indicates, the number of separations over 
the four-year analysis period is 1,326 for pay strategy 2, while it is 1,457 for pay strategy 1 and 
1,716 for pay strategy 3.  Based only on separation rates, pay strategy 3 seems the least 
attractive policy.  However, such conclusions are simplistic and superficial from a cost/benefits 
perspective; a more sophisticated and meaningful inference regarding the implications of the 
three pay strategies requires an analysis incorporating critical financial data. 
 
Estimating the Cost of Pay-For-Performance Plans 
Step 4:  Determine Movement Costs 
In steps one through three, we specified the pay-for-performance options, the estimated 
separation probabilities, and the subsequent numbers of separations and necessary 
replacements from each performance level/pay strategy combination.  Hence, one key financial 
outcome to be considered is the projected cost of employee movements into and out of the 
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workforce under each pay policy.  As we see in Table 2, relative to the retention effects of 
simply providing everyone with the same salary increase (pay strategy 1), pay strategy 2 
reduces overall separations, while pay strategy 3 increases them.  We next translate these 
projected separations and replacements into financial costs. 
We refer to the combined costs of employee separations and replacement acquisitions 
as movement costs.  These costs include direct expenses, such as separation costs (e.g., exit 
interview, separation pay), replacement costs (e.g., advertising, travel expenses, interviewing 
and testing candidates), and training costs (e.g., informational literature costs, paying trainers).  
Movement costs also include indirect expenses, such as the lower productivity of new 
employees as they learn the job, time spent by managers having to supervise new employees 
more directly, and diminished productivity of veteran employees as they mentor and help new 
employees (Cascio, 2000).  While such costs are not standard elements of traditional 
accounting systems, organizations increasingly employ software and reporting algorithms that 
calculate such metrics as turnover costs, costs per hire, etc.  If these are available, one can 
simply multiply the relevant cost by the number of separations and/or replacements that emerge 
under each pay strategy. 
Data available to calculate movement costs varies widely across companies.  When 
movement costs are not readily available from the organization, one can turn to research.  For 
example, Solomon (1988) suggested that movement costs range from 1.5 to 2.5 times the 
annual salary paid for a job (Solomon, 1988), while Johnson (1995) suggested that movement 
costs range from 93% to 200% of the position’s salary.  In our example, we estimated the 
movement cost associated with each separation as two times the average salary of all 
employees in the year of the separation (note that average salary will vary according to pay 
strategy).  We also assumed that each separation is replaced, and thus we combined all 
separation and acquisition costs into a single estimate labeled movement costs.  Should 
replacement not be expected, such as during a downsizing, separation cost estimates should 
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be applied to the number of separations, and replacement acquisition costs should be applied to 
the number of replacements (Boudreau & Berger, 1985). 
Table 3 provides the necessary information to estimate movement costs for our 
example.  At the top of the table is the workforce’s average salary in 2003 and in 2007 under 
each of the three pay strategies.  As noted above, we multiplied this salary by 2.0 to estimate 
the average movement costs for each separation, which is shown for years 2003 and 2007.  We 
then subtracted the 2003 average movement cost from the 2007 average movement cost and 
divided by four to get yearly movement cost increase, which we added to the 2003 average 
movement cost to get the 2004 average movement cost.  This was added to the 2007 average 
movement cost and the sum was divided by two to compute the average (2004-2007) 
movement cost per separation.  Table 3 also provides the total projected number of 
separations/replacements from Years 2004 to 2007, which were calculated in Table 2.  Total 
movement costs for each pay strategy over the four-year period were then calculated by 
multiplying each pay strategy’s total number of projected separations/replacements by each pay 
strategy’s average movement cost per separation/replacement. 
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Table 3 
Estimated Four-Year Movement Costs Under Different Pay Strategies 
    Pay Strategy 1 Pay Strategy 2 Pay Strategy 3 
Average Salary     
2003  $47,983 $47,983 $47,983 
2007  $56,133 $56,914 $55,966 
Movement Cost Multiplier                          
(cost of separation as multiple of salary; 
same for all three Pay Strategies) 
2.0   
Average Movement Costs (per separation)    
2003  $95,966 $95,966 $95,966 
2007  $112,266 $113,828 $111,932 
Yearly Increase in Average Movement Cost $4,075 $4,466 $3,992 
2004 Average Movement Cost  $100,041 $100,432 $99,958 
Average Movement Cost (2004 - 2007) $106,154 $107,130 $105,945 
Number of Separations  1,457 1,326 1,716 
Total Movement Costs1 $154,666,378 $142,054,380 $181,801,620 
 
Notes:  1.  Total Movement Costs were calculated assuming a linear growth in movement costs and an equal number of 
separations in each year.  Thus, Total Movement Costs could be calculated as the number of separations times the average 
2004 - 2007 movement costs.  For simplicity, we assumed a constant rate of movement cost increase over time.  This could 
easily be modified if an organization projected very significant increases or decreases in costs per movement in a given year, but 
such large discontinuities seem unlikely. 
2.  Data provided by the user are in bold. 
 
 
Table 3’s total estimated movement costs were $154.67 million, $142.05 million, and 
$181.80 million for pay strategies 1, 2, and 3, respectively.  Compared to pay strategy 1 (giving 
equal pay increases to everyone), the turnover reduction associated with the policy of linking 
pay and performance for high performers (pay strategy 2) saves $12.61 million in movement 
costs over four years.  Linking pay and performance for both high and low performers (pay 
strategy 3), however, creates additional separations among low performers and thus incurs four-
year movement costs of $27.13 million and $39.75 million more than those incurred through pay 
strategies 1 and 2, respectively. 
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Some of these costs would be evident with standard accounting tools, to the extent that 
they represent “out-of-pocket” costs such as fees to search firms or consultants providing exit 
interviews.  However, as mentioned above, many of these costs (e.g., staff time spent in 
processing separations and acquisitions) are “opportunity costs,” and only a portion of these 
savings (costs) would be recorded by the accounting system.  Thus, our analytical approach 
offers the advantage of a more complete cost analysis for incentive pay strategies.  Still, 
movement costs represent only one of the crucial financial implications of using pay-for-
performance to manage performance and turnover.  Hence, we next address the pay strategies’ 
substantial implications for differences in costs associated with pay levels, benefits, and other 
service costs. 
Step 5:  Estimate Future Service Costs 
Service costs are the total costs required to retain and support the work force, and thus 
include pay and benefits (Boudreau & Berger, 1985), the latter of which is typically the largest 
service cost component other than pay.  In some cases, service costs may vary with employee 
performance.  For example, there may be significant bonuses or stock options, or higher 
performers may use significantly more materials or resources than lower performers.  In these 
cases, which would tend to be of more relevance in executive populations, such variability in 
service costs should also be taken into account.  Absent such factors, estimating service costs 
simply involves adjusting projected salary levels upward to reflect additional service costs (i.e., 
benefits), multiplying the resulting values by the number of employees in each year, and 
summing the products across years.  Because we define total service costs as salary plus 
benefits in our example, we estimate each year’s service costs by estimating the ratio of total 
remuneration (employee benefits plus salary) to salary, and then multiplying this ratio by 
projected salary levels under each pay policy.  
In Table 3 we had established, for each pay strategy, the average salary levels for the 
full work force in 2003 and 2007.  Because we assumed that benefits were 37% of salary (U.S. 
Department of Labor, 2001), we multiplied Table 3’s average salary levels by 1.37 to reflect the 
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2003 and 2007 average service costs for each pay strategy (see Table 4).  Using the 
assumption that service costs increased linearly from 2003 to 2007, we then computed, for each 
of the three pay strategies, (a) the average service cost increase (2007 service cost minus 2003 
service cost, divided by four), (b) 2004 service cost (2003 service cost plus the average service 
cost increase), (c) the average 2004-2007 service cost (2004 service cost plus 2007 service 
cost, divided by two), and (d) the total 2004-2007 service cost (average 2004-2007 service cost 
times four, the number of years in our simulation, times 5143, the total number of employees in 
each year). 
Table 4 
Estimated Four-Year Service Costs Under Different Pay Strategies 
    Pay Strategy 1 Pay Strategy 2 Pay Strategy 3 
Average Service Cost Multiplier  
(per employee) 1.37 1.37 1.37 
Average Service Cost     
2003  $65,737 $65,737 $65,737 
2007  $76,902 $77,972 $76,673 
Yearly Increase in Service Costs $2,791 $3,059 $2,734 
2004 Average Service Cost $68,528 $68,796 $68,471 
Average Service Cost (2004 - 2007) $72,715 $73,384 $72,572 
Total Service Costs (2004 - 2007) $1,495,892,980 $1,509,655,648 $1,492,951,184 
 
Notes:  1.  Average service cost per employee is assumed to equal 1.37 times Table 3's average salary under each 
pay strategy.  Total costs were calculated assuming a linear growth in service costs.  Thus, it was estimated to equal 
the number of employees times the number of years times the average service costs (2004-2007). 
2. Data provided by the user are in bold. 
 
An implication of our decision to use the workforce average service costs to estimate 
total service costs is that it implicitly assumes that replacement employees will be paid at the 
average level of the workforce they enter.  The framework of this model can certainly 
accommodate other assumptions (e.g., stronger pay-performance links will attract better 
performers who will be paid more), and would allow practitioners to incorporate such data when 
appropriate.  We adopted the workforce-average assumption for simplicity. 
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Pay strategy 2 yielded the highest service costs; it is projected to cost $13.76 million 
more than pay strategy 1 (no performance-pay relationship).  Under pay strategy 2, pay is 
always equal (for performers at or below the performance midpoint) or higher (for performers 
above the midpoint) than pay in strategy 1.  Pay strategy 3 raises the pay for higher performers, 
but also lowers pay for lower performers, resulting in costs of $2.94 million less over four years 
than pay strategy 1, and $16.70 million less than pay strategy 2.   
Service costs (i.e., pay and benefits) are highly visible to standard accounting systems.  
In fact, one could argue that they are the most visible elements of human capital in standard 
accounting. Thus, if standard accounting were used to evaluate these pay policies, the costs 
shown in Table 4 would likely be quite evident, and would perhaps suggest an argument for pay 
strategy 3 to organizational constituents who rely on accounting information for their decisions.  
Given that the movement costs analysis suggested pay strategy 3 as the least economical 
approach, however, it is clear that relying on only a single type of cost information may well 
provide an inaccurate basis for a decision.  When we do aggregate the total movement and total 
service cost data from Tables 3 and 4, we see that pay strategy 3 is the most expensive, costing 
over $23 million more than pay strategy 2 and over $24 million more than pay  
strategy 1. 
Consequently, from a cost-based perspective, we might conclude that undertaking an 
aggressive pay-for-performance system to “win the talent war” is not worth the investment.  We 
instead caution that such an inference (and any decisions based on it) is at the least premature 
and is potentially detrimental to the organization.  High performers provide greater value than do 
low performers, and any assessment of an HR program that differentially affects the 
performance distribution of the workforce must account for this.  HR investments must be 
examined for both their “efficiency” and “effectiveness” (Boudreau & Ramstad, 2003b).  Hence, 
having addressed the movement and service costs implications of the three pay strategies’ 
effects on turnover, we next turn to the strategies’ implications for workforce’s value, an often 
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overlooked but absolutely essential consideration when assessing the financial practicality of 
human resource interventions. 
  
Estimating the Value of Pay-For-Performance Plans 
Step 6:  Determine Service Value 
Although our analyses have focused on the cost implications of the pay-for-performance 
strategies, such strategies also can produce value through the elimination of poor performers 
(and their subsequent replacement by average performers), and, in particular, the retention of 
high performers, whose retention is especially sensitive to pay-for-performance effects (Trevor 
et al., 1997).  Moreover, when differences in individual performance are high (i.e., when a high 
performer is worth much more to the organization than an average performer), retaining top 
employees and eliminating poor employees may yield value that far outweighs the associated 
costs (Boudreau & Berger, 1985; Boudreau, 1991; Boudreau & Ramstad, 1999; 2003a; 2003b).   
To examine the potential effects of performance-based pay on workforce value, we need 
to estimate the dollar value of individual performance variation.  This will allow us to estimate 
the effect that changes in the workforce’s performance distribution will have on workforce value.  
Our data provide estimates of changes in the performance ratings, so we must convert ratings 
to dollar values.  This conversion method requires two components (Boudreau & Berger, 1985):  
(a) the dollar value of the average performance level; and (b) the incremental value of 
deviations from that average performance level.3 
We employed the Schmidt and Hunter (1983) approach, which assumes that the value 
of the average performance level would equal 1.754 times the average wage at that level.  For 
the 2003 work force, we multiplied Table 3’s average salary of $47,983 by 1.754 to obtain a 
service value of $84,162 per person.  For the 2007 work force, consistent with the estimate of 
average service costs above, we estimated average salary as that which would have been 
produced by four years of average salary increases, beginning in 2004.  As noted in Table 3, 
the average 2007 salary under pay strategy 1, which allocates average salary increases across 
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the performance distribution, is estimated to be $56,133.  Multiplying this salary by 1.754 
produces an average work force value estimate of $98,457 per person.  These 2003 and 2007 
average service value estimates are shown in “average service value” section of Table 5. 
Table 5 
Computations for Estimating Individual Service Value at Each Performance Level 
 
Performance 
Ratings: 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 
Number of 
employees 60 97 1171 1090 1667 672 317 46 23 
Mean 
Performance  2.764        
Standard Dev. of 
Performance  0.668        
Z-Score of 
Performance 
Ratings 
-2.641 -1.892 -1.144 -0.395 0.353 1.102 1.850 2.599 3.347 
Average Service Value (assumed to equal 1.754 * average salary) 
2003 $84,162 $84,162 $84,162 $84,162 $84,162 $84,162 $84,162 $84,162 $84,162 
2007 $98,457 $98,457 $98,457 $98,457 $98,457 $98,457 $98,457 $98,457 $98,457 
Incremental Service Value SDy =0.30 
2003 -$38,017 -$27,235 -$16,468 -$5,686 $5,081 $15,863 $26,631 $37,412 $48,180 
2007 -$44,474 -$31,861 -$19,265 -$6,652 $5,944 $18,558 $31,154 $43,767 $56,363 
Incremental Service Value SDy =0.60 
2003 -$76,034 -$54,470 -$32,936 -$11,372 $10,163 $31,726 $53,261 $74,825 $96,359 
2007 -$88,948 -$63,722 -$38,530 -$13,304 $11,889 $37,115 $62,308 $87,534 $112,726 
Incremental Service Value SDy =0.90 
2003 -$114,051 -$81,705 -$49,403 -$17,058 $15,244 $47,590 $79,892 $112,237 $144,539 
2007 -$133,423 -$95,583 -$57,795 -$19,955 $17,833 $55,673 $93,461 $131,301 $169,089 
Total Individual Service Value (SDy = 30%)1 
2003 $46,145 $56,927 $67,694 $78,476 $89,243 $100,025 $110,793 $121,574 $132,342 
2007 $53,983 $66,596 $79,192 $91,805 $104,401 $117,015 $129,611 $142,224 $154,820 
Total Individual Service Value (SDy = 60%) 
2003 $8,128 $29,692 $51,226 $72,790 $94,325 $115,888 $137,423 $158,987 $180,521 
2007 $9,509 $34,735 $59,927 $85,153 $110,346 $135,572 $160,765 $185,991 $211,183 
Total Individual Service Value (SDy = 90%) 
2003 -$29,889 $2,457 $34,759 $67,104 $99,406 $131,752 $164,054 $196,399 $228,701 
2007 -$34,966 $2,874 $40,662 $78,502 $116,290 $154,130 $191,918 $229,758 $267,546 
Notes:  1.  Total Individual Service Value is computed as the Average Service Value plus the Incremental Service Value, shown in 
the top portion of this table.          
2.  Data provided by the user are in bold. 
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For the second component necessary to estimate the value associated with each 
employee, we needed an estimate for the value of each performance level above and below the 
average.  Combined with the estimate for the average value of individuals’ performance, this will 
allow us to calculate the value of each of the nine performance levels, in both 2003 and 2007.  
In this study, and probably characteristic of most organizations, we had no direct estimates of 
the dollar value of particular performance levels.  Hence, we used an estimation approach 
typical of utility analysis studies (e.g., Boudreau, 1991; Boudreau & Ramstad, 2003b).  Utility 
analysis typically employs an estimate of the value of a one-standard-deviation difference in 
employee value, referred to as SDy, with SDy often approximated as equal to a given 
percentage of salary (Boudreau, 1991; Cascio, 2000).  Thus, someone who performs one 
standard deviation above average (i.e., someone who is in the 84th percentile of performance) 
is estimated to be worth more than an average performer by a value equal to SDy.  Using the 
SDy term, we can compute the value of each performance category relative to the average. 
A recurring problem with using SDy is that it is unlikely to be estimated precisely 
(Boudreau, 1991; Cascio, 2000).  Furthermore, its impact on final estimates of the value of a 
utility estimate is often quite significant (Boudreau, 1991).  Thus, we investigated three potential 
values.  As a very conservative approach, we assumed that SDy would equal 30% of average 
salary.  This is substantially less than Schmidt and Hunter’s (1983) 40% recommendation, 
which has been characterized as a conventional benchmark (Becker & Huselid, 1992), a safe 
estimate (Schmidt, Hunter, Outerbridge, & Trattner, 1986), and a conservative estimate 
(Judiesch, Schmidt, & Mount, 1992).  We also used 60% of average salary as a somewhat 
conservative estimate, and we used 90% of average salary as what we believe to be a more 
realistic estimate.4 In other words, our three estimates suggest that an employee performing 
better than 84 percent of the employee population is worth 30% of salary, 60% of salary, or 90% 
of salary more to the organization than an average performer (i.e., someone performing at the 
50th percentile) in the same job. 
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In order to move from these SDy estimates to estimates of each employee’s service 
value, we first used the observed distribution of employee performance to compute the 
standardized z-score corresponding to each of the nine performance ratings.  This 
transformation, accomplished through subtracting the mean performance score from each 
performance category rating and then dividing by the performance standard deviation, produces 
a performance distribution with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.  For example, 
performance category 1.5 received a z-score of -1.89 through subtracting the average 
performance rating of 2.764 from 1.5 and dividing by the standard deviation of 0.668.  The z-
scores, which represent the number of standard deviations that each performance category 
rating deviates from the performance mean, are listed in the fifth row of data in Table 5. 
We assumed that the z-scores associated with each raw performance score would 
remain constant from 2003 to 2007.  That is, although the actual distribution of workers across 
performance categories changes from 2003 to 2007, we assumed that the value of performance 
at each performance level did not change.  For example, a performance rating of 4 in 2003, 
which was 1.850 standard deviations above the mean in 2003, provided value to the employer 
equal to mean performance’s value plus the product of 1.850 and SDy.  We assumed, 
regardless of the actual number of employees who received a score of 4 in 2007, the financial 
value of an individual with a performance rating of 4 in that year would be equal to 2007 mean 
performance’s value plus the product of 1.850 and SDy. 
For 2003, we estimated average salary as $47,983 (from Table 1), producing SDy 
estimates of $14,395 (i.e., 0.3 * $47,983), $28,790 (i.e., 0.6 * $47,983) and $43,185 (i.e., 0.9 * 
$47,983) for the 30%, 60% and 90% SDy scenarios, respectively.  For 2007, estimated average 
salary was $56,133 (from Table 1), producing, at the 30%, 60%, and 90% SDy scenarios, 
estimated SDy levels of $16,840 (i.e., 0.3 * $56,133), $33,680 (i.e., 0.6 * $56,133), and $50,520 
(i.e., 0.9 * $56,133).  Multiplying these SDy estimates (i.e., the appropriate dollar value of a one 
standard deviation performance difference) by the z-scores (i.e., the number of standard 
deviations the performance category is from the mean) produced the “incremental” (beyond the 
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average) dollar values corresponding to each performance rating level for each SDy assumption 
(see Table 5).  Thus, under the 60% assumption in 2007, an employee at performance level 5.0 
is worth $112,726 more than an average employee (i.e., $56,133 * 0.60 * 3.347).  The sums of 
the average service values for the workforce, and the incremental service values for each 
performance category, produced the individual service values for each performance category 
that are reported in the bottom section of Table 5.  Thus, the last six lines of data in Table 5 
represent, for each unique combination of performance level (1.0 – 5.0 at half point intervals), 
year (2003 and 2007), and SDy scenario (30%, 60%, and 90%), the individual service value for 
each employee. 
With individual service values determined for both 2003 and 2007, we can now compute 
the total service value for the workforce under each of the three pay strategies.  For 2003 (for all 
three pay strategies), we calculated the total service value of the workforce by multiplying each 
performance category’s individual service value by the corresponding quantity of employees in 
the performance category, and adding the products.  Thus, for example, Table 5’s individual 
service value of $115,888 for SDy = 60% and performance = 3.5 in 2003 is multiplied by 672 
(the number of employees in that performance category) to yield the $77,876,736 figure in Table 
6 (under SDy = 60% and performance = 3.5).  This $77,876,736 is then added to the similarly 
computed values for the other eight performance categories to produce, when SDy = 60%, 
Table 6’s total 2003 service value of $432,351,857.  This is our estimate of what the workforce 
is worth to the employer in 2003 under the assumption that being one standard deviation above 
average in performance is worth 60% of an average performer’s salary. We note that the total 
service values are the same in 2003 regardless of pay strategy (although they do differ across 
SDy assumptions) because the three pay strategies had yet to result in the different 
performance-specific turnover patterns that begin in 2004. 
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Table 6 
Computing Total Service Value (2003 Employees) 
 
Performance 
Ratings: 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 Total 
Number of 
employees 60 97 1171 1090 1667 672 317 46 23 5143 
2003 Total Service Value 
SDy = 30% $2,768,700 $5,521,919 $79,269,674 $85,538,840 $148,768,081 $67,216,800 $35,121,381 $5,592,404 $3,043,866 $430,072,965 
SDy = 60% $487,680 $2,880,124 $59,985,646 $79,341,100 $157,239,775 $77,876,736 $43,563,091 $7,313,402 $4,151,983 $432,351,857 
SDy = 90% -$1,793,340 $238,329 $40,702,789 $73,143,360 $165,709,802 $88,537,344 $52,005,118 $9,034,354 $5,260,123 $434,631,219 
 
Note:  The total service values are the same in 2003 regardless of pay strategy (although they do differ across SDy assumptions) because the three 
pay strategies had yet to result in the different performance-specific turnover patterns that begin in 2004. 
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For 2007, calculation of the total service value of the workforce is slightly more complex, 
as the computations for those employees retained over the four-year analysis differ from the 
computations required for those hired as replacements during the four-year period.  For the 
retained employees, 2007 total service value calculation closely resembles the approach to 
2003, where Table 5’s 2003 individual service values for each SDy level and performance 
category combination were multiplied by the quantity of retained employees for each 
performance category, and these products were summed.  In 2007, however, the three pay 
strategies’ different effects on performance-specific turnover result in pay strategy-specific 
numbers of retained employees in each performance category.  Consequently, we need to 
conduct the individual service value by employee quantity multiplications separately for each 
pay strategy to get the 2007 estimates.  Thus, Table 5’s 2007 individual service values for each 
SDy level and performance category combination were multiplied by the quantity of retained 
employees for each performance category under each pay strategy, and these products were 
summed.  For example, Table 5’s individual service value of $129,611 for SDy = 30% and 
performance = 4.0 in 2007 is multiplied by 231, 282, and 282 (the number of retained 
employees in that performance category under the three pay strategies, as listed in Table 7) to 
yield the  $29,940,141, $36,550,302, and $36,550,302 figures in Table 7 (under SDy = 30%, 
performance = 4.0, and pay strategies 1, 2, and 3, respectively).  Thus, the final nine rows of 
data in Table 7 chronicle, for each SDy and pay strategy combination, the combined service 
value of all retained employees in 2007 at each performance level.  The final column for each of 
these nine rows provides total service values across performance categories. 
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Table 7 
Total Service Value of Retained Employees (2007) 
Performance 
Ratings: 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 Total 
Retained Employees 
Pay Strategy 1 2 34 726 818 1317 524 231 27 8 3687 
Pay Strategy 2 2 34 726 818 1317 578 282 41 20 3818 
Pay Strategy 3 1 12 468 709 1317 578 282 41 20 3428 
Total Service Value (2007) 
SDy = 30%           
Pay Strategy 1 $107,966 $2,264,264 $57,493,392 $75,096,490 $137,496,117 $61,315,860 $29,940,141 $3,840,048 $1,238,560 $368,792,838 
Pay Strategy 2 $107,966 $2,264,264 $57,493,392 $75,096,490 $137,496,117 $67,634,670 $36,550,302 $5,831,184 $3,096,400 $385,570,785 
Pay Strategy 3 $53,983 $799,152 $37,061,856 $65,089,745 $137,496,117 $67,634,670 $36,550,302 $5,831,184 $3,096,400 $353,613,409 
SDy = 60%           
Pay Strategy 1 $19,018 $1,180,990 $43,507,002 $69,655,154 $145,325,682 $71,039,728 $37,136,715 $5,021,757 $1,689,464 $374,575,510 
Pay Strategy 2 $19,018 $1,180,990 $43,507,002 $69,655,154 $145,325,682 $78,360,616 $45,335,730 $7,625,631 $4,223,660 $395,233,483 
Pay Strategy 3 $9,509 $416,820 $28,045,836 $60,373,477 $145,325,682 $78,360,616 $45,335,730 $7,625,631 $4,223,660 $369,716,961 
SDy = 90%           
Pay Strategy 1 -$69,932 $97,716 $29,520,612 $64,214,636 $153,153,930 $80,764,120 $44,333,058 $6,203,466 $2,140,368 $380,357,974 
Pay Strategy 2 -$69,932 $97,716 $29,520,612 $64,214,636 $153,153,930 $89,087,140 $54,120,876 $9,420,078 $5,350,920 $404,895,976 
Pay Strategy 3 -$34,966 $34,488 $19,029,816 $55,657,918 $153,153,930 $89,087,140 $54,120,876 $9,420,078 $5,350,920 $385,820,200 
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Having computed 2007 service value for retained employees, we next address the 2007 
value of those employees hired to replace the employees that separated during the 2004-2007 
window.  These replacement employees were assumed to have an individual service value 
equal to the average individual service value of retained employees under pay strategy 1 for 
each of the SDy assumptions.  Thus, for example, Table 8’s average individual replacement 
employee service value of $101,594 when SDy = 60% was computed by dividing Table 7’s total 
retainee service value of $374,575,510, which is under pay strategy 1 with SDy = 60%, by 3687, 
which is Table 7’s total retainees under pay strategy 1.  We note that using pay strategy 1’s 
retainee service value for all replacements assumes that the recruiting effectiveness and job 
performance of replacement employees are not affected by the compensation system.  Because 
the average service value of retained employees under pay strategies 2 and 3 is greater than 
the average service value of employees retained under pay strategy 1, this provides a 
conservative estimate of replacement service value under the two pay strategies with pay-for-
performance links.  The total service value of replacement employees for each pay strategy and 
SDy combination is equal to the pay strategy-specific number of replacements times the SDy-
specific average service value.  These totals are reported in the bottom three rows of data in 
Table 8.    
Table 8 
Service Value of Replacement Employees (2007) 
  Pay Strategy 1 Pay Strategy 2 Pay Strategy 3 
Average Service Value    
SDy = 30% $100,025 $100,025 $100,025 
SDy = 60% $101,594 $101,594 $101,594 
SDy = 90% $103,162 $103,162 $103,162 
Number of Separations (2004-2007) 1457 1326 1716 
Total Service Value of Replacements (2007)    
SDy = 30% $145,736,425 $132,633,150 $171,642,900 
SDy = 60% $148,022,458 $134,713,644 $174,335,304 
SDy = 90% $150,307,034 $136,792,812 $177,025,992 
 
Note:  We are using the conservative assumption that replacement employees will have the service value of employees under the 
first pay strategy.  Our approach implicitly assumes that the pay strategy has no effect on recruitment or job performance of new 
employees.  If we assumed that new employees had service values equal to the average service values of employees under the 
new pay strategies, then the total service value of replacements would be higher under pay strategies 2 and 3. 
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Finally, Table 8’s service values of the replacements and Table 7’s service values of 
retained employees were added to produce the estimated 2007 total service value for each pay 
strategy and SDy level combination, as shown in Table 9.  We used these 2007 total service 
values, as well as the 2003 total service values from Table 6, to compute total service value 
across all years in Table 10.  As we had done with total service costs computations, we 
calculated the four-year stream of service value levels by assuming that service value rose 
linearly in each performance category between 2003 and 2007.  Thus, for each pay strategy 
and SDy combination, we computed (a) the average service value increase (2007 service value 
minus 2003 service value, divided by four); (b) 2004 service value (2003 service value plus the 
average service value increase); (c) the average 2004-2007 service value (2004 service value 
plus 2007 service value, divided by 2); and (d), the total 2003-2007 service value (average 
2003-2007 service value, times four, the number of years in our simulation).   
Table 9 
Total Service Value of the 2007 Workforce 
 
  
Value of Retained 
Employees + 
Value of 
Replaced 
Employees 
= Total Value (2007) 
SDy = 30%      
Pay Strategy 1 $368,792,838 + $145,736,425 = $514,529,263 
Pay Strategy 2 $385,570,785 + $132,633,150 = $518,203,935 
Pay Strategy 3 $353,613,409 + $171,642,900 = $525,256,309 
SDy = 60%      
Pay Strategy 1 $374,575,510 + $148,022,458 = $522,597,968 
Pay Strategy 2 $395,233,483 + $134,713,644 = $529,947,127 
Pay Strategy 3 $369,716,961 + $174,335,304 = $544,052,265 
SDy = 90%      
Pay Strategy 1 $380,357,974 + $150,307,034 = $530,665,008 
Pay Strategy 2 $404,895,976 + $136,792,812 = $541,688,788 
Pay Strategy 3 $385,820,200 + $177,025,992 = $562,846,192 
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Table 10 
Computing Four Year Total Service Value 
 
  Pay Strategy 1 Pay Strategy 2 Pay Strategy 3 
SDy = 30%    
2003 Service Value $430,072,965 $430,072,965 $430,072,965 
2007 Service Value $514,529,263 $518,203,935 $525,256,309 
Average Service Value Increase $21,114,075 $22,032,743 $23,795,836 
2004 Service Value $451,187,040 $452,105,708 $453,868,801 
Avg. (2004 - 2007 Service Value) $482,858,152 $485,154,822 $489,562,555 
Total Service Value (2004-2007) $1,931,432,608 $1,940,619,288 $1,958,250,220 
SDy = 60%    
2003 Service Value $432,351,857 $432,351,857 $432,351,857 
2007 Service Value $522,597,968 $529,947,127 $544,052,265 
Average Service Value Increase $22,561,528 $24,398,818 $27,925,102 
2004 Service Value $454,913,385 $456,750,675 $460,276,959 
Avg. (2004 - 2007 Service Value) $488,755,677 $493,348,901 $502,164,612 
Total Service Value (2004-2007) $1,955,022,708 $1,973,395,604 $2,008,658,448 
SDy = 90%    
2003 Service Value $434,631,219 $434,631,219 $434,631,219 
2007 Service Value $530,665,008 $541,688,788 $562,846,192 
Average Service Value Increase $24,008,447 $26,764,392 $32,053,743 
2004 Service Value $458,639,666 $461,395,611 $466,684,962 
Avg. (2004 - 2007 Service Value) $494,652,337 $501,542,200 $514,765,577 
Total Service Value (2004-2007) $1,978,609,348 $2,006,168,800 $2,059,062,308 
 
 
Under all assumptions about SDy, the 2007 and total service values are lowest when 
giving all employees average pay increases (pay strategy 1), are higher when giving high 
performers high pay increases and all others average increases (pay strategy 2), and are 
highest when the pay-for-performance link was strongest (pay strategy 3).  Compared to pay 
strategy 1, which gives all employees average pay increases, pay strategy 2 prompts more 
high-performing and highly-paid employees to stay, and their value enhances the work force.  
Pay strategy 3 augments this effect by encouraging the turnover of low performers, who 
subsequently are replaced with workers whose expected value is that of average workers under 
pay strategy 1. 
Is It Worth It to Win the Talent War?  CAHRS WP03-12 
 
 
Page 35 
Hence, whereas our cost analysis suggested that pay strategy 3 was the least effective 
and pay strategy 1 was the most effective, our analysis of workforce value indicates the exact 
opposite.  Obviously, relying only on either cost or value estimates would be shortsighted.  The 
critical question is whether the service value benefits of a strong pay-for-performance link 
outweigh the costs (Boudreau, 1991; Boudreau & Ramstad, 2003a; 2003b). 
Step 7:  Determining the Final Utility—Is Pay-for-Performance Worth it? 
At this point, we return to the flow chart in Figure 1 and the question that motivated this 
research effort:  Is it worth it to use pay-for-performance in an attempt to win the war for talent?  
To speak to this, we began by specifying three pay plan strategies and estimating the 
subsequent turnover probabilities and performance distributions we would expect under each.  
Using this turnover and performance information, we then addressed costs for each pay plan 
through the estimation of expenses associated with employee movement out of and into the 
workforce and with the pay and benefits for the workforce.  Having estimated costs, we turned 
to the benefits dimension of the cost-benefit analysis and estimated the value of the retained 
workforce and of the replacement employees.  Thus, we have estimated the three components 
for the decision of whether pay-for-performance makes sense in our example:  (a) the four-year 
stream of movement costs; (b) the four-year stream of service costs; and (c), the four-year 
stream of service value.  Now, we combine these components to estimate the relative value of 
the three pay strategies by taking the stream of service value and subtracting the stream of 
service costs and movement costs (Boudreau & Berger, 1985).  The relevant amounts are 
summarized in Table 11 for each pay strategy and SDy assumption combination. 
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Table 11 
Computation of Four Year Investment Value of Different Pay Strategies (in $millions) 
 
 
Service 
Value      
(in 
$millions) - 
Service 
Costs      
(in 
$millions) - 
Movement 
Costs        
(in $millions) = 
Four Year 
Value        
(in 
$millions) 
Difference 
from Pay 
Strategy 1 
% Change 
from Pay 
Strategy 1 
SDy = 30%          
Pay Strategy 1 $1,931.43  $1,495.89  $154.67  $280.87 -- -- 
Pay Strategy 2 $1,940.62  $1,509.66  $142.05  $288.91 $8.04 2.86% 
Pay Strategy 3 $1,958.25  $1,492.95  $181.80  $283.50 $2.62 0.91% 
SDy = 60%          
Pay Strategy 1 $1,955.02  $1,495.89  $154.67  $304.46 -- -- 
Pay Strategy 2 $1,973.40  $1,509.66  $142.05  $321.69 $17.22 5.66% 
Pay Strategy 3 $2,008.66  $1,492.95  $181.80  $333.91 $29.44 9.15% 
SDy = 90%          
Pay Strategy 1 $1,978.61  $1,495.89  $154.67  $328.05 -- -- 
Pay Strategy 2 $2,006.17  $1,509.66  $142.05  $354.46 $26.41 8.05% 
Pay Strategy 3 $2,059.06   $1,492.95   $181.80   $384.31 $56.26 15.87% 
 
These results suggest a different conclusion from the cost analysis presented earlier.  
Recall that traditional compensation-cost analyses may have led decision makers to the 
conclusion that a strong link between pay and performance would be unwise given its extreme 
cost, and that although a moderate pay-for-performance link was not much more expensive 
than having no link, there were no cost-based data to strongly suggest it as a compelling 
alternative.  When the potential benefits of workforce value are accounted for, however, it 
becomes clear that investments in performance-based pay may hold the potential for significant 
organizational improvement.  Table 11 indicates that even under our most conservative SDy 
assumption, pay-for-performance plans yielded greater net values than did the non-contingent 
pay strategy.  That is, by fully incorporating both costs and benefits into our assessment, we 
find that, under all of our conditions, pay-for-performance is indeed a valuable investment.  
Moreover, as SDy (i.e., the value associated with performance differences) became larger, the 
payoff to pay-for-performance increased dramatically, ultimately (i.e., at SDy = 90%) resulting in 
advantages, relative to the non-contingent pay from pay strategy 1, of over $26 and $56 million 
dollars for the partially contingent and highly contingent pay strategies, respectively. 
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Discussion 
This analysis suggests that even under conservative assumptions about the value of 
performance variability among employees, the four-year financial benefit of linking pay to 
performance in this company would be substantial.  When these SDy assumptions are closer to 
what we believe to be more realistic (i.e., if job performance differences have greater value to 
an organization), the present model reveals the potentially high payoff from investments in 
performance-based pay.  Moreover, our analysis vividly illustrates the limitations of standard 
accounting and behavioral cost-based approaches for identifying the critical variables and, thus, 
the appropriate pay strategy.  
Simplifying decisions 
 Because utility analysis can be rather complex, we used a number of simplifying 
decisions here.  First, we assumed that replacement employees would be of average 
performance level (and, thus, average service value).  This implicitly assumes that pay-for-
performance would not influence applicant attraction, even though research suggests that the 
degree to which pay and performance are linked does in fact matter to applicants (Cable & 
Judge, 1994).  Second, in focusing on the relationship between pay-for-performance and 
turnover, we made no provisions for whether the performance-based pay would actually 
improve workforce performance (net of retention effects).  This implicit modeling of no effect of 
performance-based pay on performance is particularly noteworthy given that the contingent pay 
plan in the Trevor et al. (1997) study was sufficiently well designed to elicit a performance-
specific retention pattern. Third, we were working with the relatively normally distributed 
performance distribution from the Trevor et al. sample.  While using this distribution simplified 
matters by allowing us to make use of other aspects of the Trevor et al. study, we recognize that 
many performance distributions may be characterized by a greater proportion of employees 
being rated in the top two or three performance categories and by the subsequent negative 
skew.  The Trevor et al. distribution arose because the organization, consistent with its 
individualistic and hierarchical culture, encouraged differentiation among employees during 
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performance appraisal.  Additionally, because Trevor et al. used averaged performance levels 
(with a mean of 3.05 performance ratings per employee), such factors as change in 
performance over time and random error in ratings combined to reduce the likelihood of having 
an average rating in the very top or bottom performance levels. To the extent that an 
organization with an aggressive pay-for-performance plan does encourage or mandate a normal 
performance distribution, however, the implications are noteworthy.  For example, the system 
allocates large raises to the relatively few high performers, who should then be satisfied, 
motivated, and likely to remain; in contrast, the system also may frustrate, de-motivate, and 
ultimately result in increased turnover among employees that might be reasonably high 
performers but were not rated as such as a result of the forced distribution. 
We emphasize that each of the three simplifying decisions was made to facilitate our 
presentation rather than strengthen our results.  Indeed, each decision actually weakens the 
results’ apparent support for performance-based pay.  In unreported analyses, we incorporated 
into the utility analysis improved applicant quality under pay strategies 2 and 3, improved 
performance (net of retention effects) under pay strategies 2 and 3, and a more negative skew 
in the performance distribution.  In each case, these alternative approaches to the decision in 
question resulted in a larger net advantage for pay strategy 2 and, to an even greater extent, for 
pay strategy 3.  Thus, the analyses we presented here are a simplified and conservative 
approach.  The spreadsheets available from the first author can be adapted to test such 
alternative assumptions.     
On Overcoming the “Futility of Utility” 
Our simplifying decisions notwithstanding, the analyses presented here entail much 
detail and speculation that, according to utility analysis criticism, might hinder their acceptance 
in managerial ranks.  Indeed, we are quite aware of the “futility of utility” (Latham & Whyte, 
1997; Whyte & Latham, 1994) findings in which utility analysis appeared to reduce managerial 
support for an HR intervention.  To a large extent, the futility of utility problem likely resides 
within the presenter and recipients of utility analysis data, rather than with utility analysis itself.  
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In defense of utility analysis, Sturman (2000) concludes that managers need to understand 
utility analysis and be trained in the use of the technology.   Citing the necessity of managers 
making decisions based on the Merton and Scholes options pricing formula to have experience 
in finance and economics, Sturman (2000) argued that “For a complex decision making tool to 
be useful, the users of the decision aid must desire the information it provides and be trained in 
its use” (p. 297).  Hence, rather than being apologists for the complexity of utility analysis, we 
believe that in-house I/O psychologists should attempt to convey that it is important for key 
stakeholders to have some basic grounding in sophisticated human resource decision-making.  
Given that labor costs often comprise over half of all operating costs (Milkovich & Newman, 
2002), training decision makers in a decision tool designed to inform as to the optimal way to 
allocate these costs would appear to be a valid undertaking. On the presenter side, Cronshaw 
(1997), after participating as the expert utility presenter in the Whyte and Latham (1997) “futility” 
study, contended that “it is not utility analysis per se that imperils I/O psychologists, but the 
intemperate way it is often used.  In effect, the messenger kills the message” (p. 614). 
Cronshaw advocated that utility analysis should be presented as an informational tool rather 
than as a “persuasive tool in a one-sided (and often self-serving) attempt to ‘sell’ innovations to 
managers” (p. 614).     
Boudreau and Ramstad (1999; 2002) noted that the powerful influence of disciplines 
such as Finance and Marketing evolved from their focus on enhancing decisions about the key 
resource (money or customers), rather than on selling accounting or sales programs, and 
suggested that the influence of HR and I/O professionals will increase with a similar focus on 
talent decisions.  They suggested (Boudreau & Ramstad, 2002, 2003a; 2003b) the HC BRidge® 
decision model for “talent” resources that draws upon well-developed decision models to 
delineate three fundamental elements: efficiency, effectiveness and impact.  The present 
analysis vividly shows the value of integrating “efficiency” (payroll and movement costs); 
“effectiveness” (changes in movement patterns); and “impact” (value of improvements in 
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performance) into a decision support model, and the dangers of decision frameworks based 
solely on efficiency or effectiveness alone. 
In addition to these emphases on decision maker training and on presenting utility 
analysis as an informative tool rather than marketing it as a panacea, we also offer a few 
additional suggestions that might assist the I-O psychologist in communicating utility analyses.  
First, expectations should be set at the outset by affirming that the evaluation will be somewhat 
complex, just as would be expected from manufacturing, finance, or accounting.  Any simplistic 
attempt to estimate performance-based pay’s effects on the bottom line would be superficial and 
incomplete.  Second, communicating the utility analysis would probably benefit from an initially 
broad explanation.  Perhaps using something similar to our Figure 1 as a guide, the practitioner 
should emphasize the simple cost-benefit concepts of movement costs, service costs, 
performance-specific retention, and the critical, but often overlooked, workforce value. We 
believe that it would be wise to continually hearken back to these big picture concepts, with 
emphasis on effects rather than on measures (Cascio, 2000) and technical details (Hoffman, 
1996).  Third, acceptance may be facilitated via emphasis on the conservative nature of the 
assumptions, decisions, and subsequent estimates (Hoffman, 1996).  Finally, highlighting the 
rationale for these assumptions and decisions should demystify them, and using the 
spreadsheets to instantaneously show the effects of changing them may provide valuable “best 
case” and “worse case” scenarios.  Together, these recommendations should assist in 
indicating that well-designed performance-based pay is worth considering, and that HR is able 
to quantitatively evaluate the relevant alternatives.   
Limitations and Conclusions 
Several limitations are noteworthy.  Our results reflect one organization’s characteristics, 
such as plan specifics, the individual job performance distribution, and the relationship between 
pay-for-performance and turnover.  The extent to which this organization, its employees, and 
our conclusions are representative of other firms and employees with regard to these factors is 
unknown. What is critical, however, is that the approach we took to finding these results can be 
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applied in a wide variety of situations, thus enabling the examination of external validity.  A 
second limiting factor in our study is that there may be additional pay strategy-specific training 
costs or administrative costs that we did not include.  We believe, however, that such costs 
could easily be incorporated into this framework.  Third, as discussed throughout this study, we 
made a number of assumptions and decisions in order to conduct the analyses.  Although we 
believe that we took the most logical and conservative approaches at these junctures, viable 
arguments could be made for approaches different from our own.  Fourth, although we modeled 
employees’ performance levels as stable over time, research has shown that employee 
performance levels change over time (e.g., Deadrick, Bennett, & Russell, 1997; Ployhart & 
Hakel, 1998; Sturman & Trevor, 2001).  Furthermore, changes in performance levels are related 
to the likelihood of turnover, even after controlling for the effects of current performance levels 
(Harrison et al., 1996; Sturman & Trevor, 2001).  Considering the movement of employees 
between different performance categories across years, and the implications of these 
movements for forecasting turnover, would certainly add complexity to the model we presented.  
It may be valuable for future research to explore the implications of these model refinements. 
The method we describe involves a significant amount of calculation, but is relatively 
simple to replicate on a spreadsheet.  Actual replication may require some customization to fit a 
specific company’s profile, but the basic premise of the methods should be the same.  We hope 
that this demonstration will inspire organizations to more fully tap available research findings to 
help them enhance their HR policy decision-making. We also hope that this paper helps 
demonstrate the value of research findings like those reported in Trevor et al. (1997) and will be 
complemented by future research on additional factors that may influence the pay-for-
performance link with turnover.  For example, satisfaction with different types of pay-for-
performance plans (e.g., raises versus bonuses) can have different effects on outcomes of 
organizational interest, such as job satisfaction and organizational commitment (Sturman & 
Short, 2000).  Ideally, the research presented here will encourage extensions of this work that 
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can prove valuable for both understanding HR practices in general and for evaluating specific 
HR policies. 
Organizations of all types will likely respond to increasing pressures to “win the talent 
war” by employing all available tools to enhance attraction, selection, and retention processes.  
A formidable tool in this endeavor is the accumulated knowledge available from 
industrial/organizational psychology and human resources research.  The method described 
here illustrates how utility analysis can be used to demystify and integrate this research, making 
it a more practical decision-making tool, and thus a more potent influence on significant 
strategic organizational goals (Boudreau, 1991; Boudreau & Ramstad, 1997; 1999; 2002; 
2003a; 2003b).  
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Footnotes 
1. The Boudreau and Berger (1985) model in its purest form would calculate the work force 
value in each intervening year and apply a discount factor to equalize the time value of the 
dollar amounts.  While these economic corrections can yield substantial changes to the 
estimated value (Sturman, 2000), such embellishments do not have a significant effect in 
this case because the changes in dollar amounts are assumed to be linear, the time frame is 
relatively short, and our focus is on the relative (versus absolute) value of the different 
strategies. We also did not have information about the organizational tax rate, so we report 
our results in pre-tax dollars. After-tax effects could be easily calculated by multiplying the 
final results by an appropriate after-tax proportion, but the relative effects of the options 
would not be altered. 
 
2. The Bureau of Labor Statistics provides a wealth of information on hourly earnings for 
diverse groups and occupations (see BLS, 2002).  We used the average hourly earnings 
and weekly hours of all white collar occupations, excluding sales jobs.  The most recent 
information shows that white collar, full-time employees (excluding sales) earned an 
average hourly wage of $21.65 and worked an average of 39.4 hours per week in 2001.  
Based on the 29th Annual Report on the 2002-2003 Total Salary Increase Budget Survey 
(WorldatWork, 2002), salary increases averaged 3.9% for exempt salaried employees in 
2002, and is projected to increase 4.1% for 2003.  This led us to use an estimated hourly 
wage of $23.42, for a total salary for 2003 of $47,983.  Note again that anyone employing 
the methods described in this paper can simply enter the data from other sources, such as 
their own company’s data.  The value we chose was intended to capture a broad, 
generalizable sample.  More importantly, it is intended to be a reasonable estimate to help 
illustrate our technique.   
 
3.  There is no single accepted method of estimating the dollar value of average performance 
among workers or applicants.  Some research has suggested that average performance 
value can be estimated equal to the average compensation of the work group (Boudreau, 
1991, p. 654; Raju, Burke & Normand, 1990, p. 9).  However, it seems unlikely that average-
performing employees produce only enough value to offset their direct wage costs.  
Considering the other service costs that are incurred, and the need for organizations to 
obtain a positive return on costs, a higher level of average service value seems likely.  
Based on an analysis of wage and productivity estimates in the national income accounts of 
the United States, Schmidt and Hunter (1983) proposed assuming that the ratio of average 
dollar value to average wage is approximately 1.754. 
 
4.  Support of the 90% approach is provided by Becker and Huselid (1992), who found direct 
observations of SDy fell in the 74% to 100% of mean salary range.  Moreover, because 
researchers generally contend that SDy increases as job complexity increases (e.g., 
Judiesch et al., 1992), our 30% and 60% SDy values would appear to have additional 
support as conservative estimates, given our sample of all exempt hires in a large company.
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Appendix 
Computing Separation Probabilities Using Survival Analysis Results 
Our estimation uses the survival analysis from Trevor et al.’s (1997) Table 4 (model 1). 
 
Probability of survival = S(0)e(ßX) , 
 where S(0) = baseline probability of survival, which was 0.77, 
  ß = a vector of survival analysis regression coefficients, 
  X = a vector of independent variables, 
  (ßX) = 4.941 + 0.314 * Salary Growth - 2.541 * Performance +  
             0.553 * Performance2 - 0.020 * Performance3 + 0.007 * Salary Growth3 - 0.663 
* Salary Growth * Performance + 0.071 * Salary Growth * Performance2 
 
The salary growth data used to estimate the equation above was measured in thousands of 
dollars.  Thus, to use the equation, our example’s percentage increases had to be converted to 
a parallel salary growth measure for each pay strategy and performance level combination.  To 
do so, we determined the average pay growth under each strategy by subtracting 2003 pay 
from 2007 pay, dividing by 4, and then dividing this amount by 1000. 
 
For example, under strategy 3 and performance level 2.5, the average pay increase was 
[($54,005 - $47,983) / 4]/1000 = 1.5055.  The table below lists the salary growth for each pay 
strategy and performance level. 
 
Performance 
Category 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 
Strategy 1 2.0375 2.0375 2.0375 2.0375 2.0375 2.0375 2.0375 2.0375 2.0375 
Strategy 2 2.0375 2.0375 2.0375 2.0375 2.0375 2.5853 3.1485 3.7283 4.3243 
Strategy 3 0.000 0.4870 0.9888 1.5055 2.0375 2.5853 3.1485 3.7283 4.3243 
 
Next, we need to estimate separation probability (i.e., 1 - probability of survival): 1 - S(0)e(ßX). 
For example, for performers rated at 5.0 under Pay Strategy 2, the pay increase of 8% 
translates to an average dollar increase (in thousands) of 4.3243, which yields a separation 
probability = 1 - .77e(ßX) = 1 - .77e(4.941 –5.467) = 1 - .77e(-0.526) = 1 - .77(0.5910) = 1 - 0.86 
= 0.14. See Table 2 for separation probabilities at each performance level/pay strategy 
combination. 
 
The 4.941 constant in the (ßX) calculation resulted from adding the estimated model constant 
(6.810) from Trevor et al.’s equation to the sum of the model terms that included neither 
performance nor salary growth (e.g. age, promotions).  These terms were evaluated at the 
means of the respective X variables.  As an aside, we advocate centering variables prior to 
conducting hazard analyses, which causes the model constant and variables set at their means 
to drop out, thus simplifying the calculation of survival probabilities (Retherford & Choe, 1993; 
Trevor, 2001).  See Trevor (2001) and Morita et al. (1993) for more on computing survival 
probabilities.      
